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Abstract—Wireless communications empowered by Reconfig-
urable Intelligent (meta)Surfaces (RISs) are recently gaining
remarkable research attention due to the increased system design
flexibility offered by RISs for diverse functionalities. In this paper,
we consider a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) physical
layer security system including one legitimate passive and one
eavesdropping passive RIS with the former being transparent to
the eavesdropper and the latter’s presence being unknown at the
legitimate link. We first focus on the eavesdropping subsystem
and present a joint design of the eavesdropper’s combining vector
and the reflection coefficients of the eavesdropping RIS. Then,
focusing on secrecy rate maximization, we propose a transmission
scheme that jointly designs the legitimate precoding vector and
Artificial Noise (AN) covariance matrix, as well as the reflection
coefficients of the legitimate RIS. Our simulation results reveal
that, in the absence of a legitimate RIS, AN and precoding are in-
capable of offering nonzero secrecy rates even for eavesdropping
RISs with small numbers of unit elements. However, when a L-
element legitimate RIS is deployed, confidential communication
can be safeguarded against cases with even more than a 3L-
element eavesdropping RIS.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, metasurfaces, MIMO, optimiza-
tion, physical layer security, reconfigurable intelligent surfaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reconfigurable Intelligent (meta)Surfaces (RISs) have been
recently envisioned as a revolutionary means to transform
any passive wireless communication environment to an active
reconfigurable one [1]–[3], offering increased environmental
intelligence for diverse communication objectives. A RIS is
an artificial planar structure with integrated electronic circuits
[4] that can be programmed to manipulate an incoming
electromagnetic field in a wide variety of functionalities [5],
[6]. Among the various RIS-enabled objectives belongs the
Physical Layer Security (PLS) [7], which is considered as a
companion technology to conventional cryptography, targeting
at significantly enhancing the quality of secure communication
in beyond 5-th generation (5G) wireless networks.
One of the very first recent studies on RIS-enabled PLS
systems is [8], which considered a legitimate Multiple Input
Single Output (MISO) broadcast system, multiple eavesdrop-
pers, and one RIS for various configurations for the reflections
coefficients of its discrete unit elements. In that work, aiming
at safeguarding legitimate communication, an alternating opti-
mization approach for designing the RIS phase matrix and the
legitimate precoder was presented together with a suboptimal
scheme based on Zero Forcing (ZF) precoding that nulls infor-
mation leakage to the eavesdroppers. In [9], the secrecy rate
maximization problem was investigated for a RIS-empowered
legitimate system comprising of a multi-antenna transmitter
and a single-antenna receiver in the vicinity of an eavesdropper
with multiple antenna elements. Efficient resource allocation
algorithms for the case of multiple legitimate receivers and one
eavesdropper were presented in [10]–[12]. The MISO secrecy
channel with the help of a single legitimate RIS was also
considered in [13] with the goal to minimize the transmit
power subject to a constraint which keeps the secrecy rate
above a target value. It was shown by means of computer
simulations that RIS deployment leads to transmit power reser-
vation. On the other hand, a new type of attack, termed as RIS
jamming attack, was investigated in [14], according to which
a passive RIS reflects jamming signals harming legitimate
communication. The presented experimental results exhibited
that the legitimate received signal can be downgraded up to
98%, witnessing that a RIS can be effectively used by the
eavesdropping side for zero-power jamming.
All above recent studies indicate that RIS-empowered PLS
systems are able to offer increased flexibility for both the
legitimate and eavesdropping sides, enabling increased secrecy
or jamming or cooperative jamming [15] in efficient ways. In
this paper, we study Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO)
PLS systems with both legitimate and eavesdropping passive
RISs. Focusing first on the eavesdropping subsystem, we
present a joint design of the eavesdropper’s combining vector
and the reflection coefficients of the eavesdropping RIS. Then,
by formulating and solving a novel joint design problem for
the legitimate subsystem, we propose a PLS transmission
scheme incorporating legitimate precoding and Artificial Noise
(AN), and passive beamforming from the legitimate RIS. Our
simulation results demonstrate that AN and legitimate RIS can
secure confidential communication over eavesdropping RISs
with large numbers of unit elements.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are denoted by boldface low-
ercase and boldface capital letters, respectively. The transpose,
conjugate, Hermitian transpose, and inverse of A are denoted
by AT , A∗, AH , and A−1, respectively, and |A| is the
determinant ofA, while In (n ≥ 2) is the n×n identity matrix
and 0n×m (n,m ≥ 2) is a n×m matrix with zeros. Tr(A) and
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Fig. 1. The considered PLS system comprising of three multi-antenna nodes
and two multi-element RISs, one serving the eavesdropper E and the other
the legitimate BS-RX link. BS is assumed unaware of the existence of the
eavesdropping RIS, the same is assumed for E regarding the legitimate RIS.
umax(A) representA’s trace and eigenvector corresponding to
its maximum eigenvalue, respectively, while notation A ≻ 0
(A  0) means that the square matrix A is Hermitian positive
definite (semi-definite). [A]i,j is the (i, j)-th element ofA, [a]i
is a’s i-th element of a, diag{a} denotes a square diagonal
matrix with a’s elements in its main diagonal, and ∇af is
the gradient vector of a scalar function f along the direction
indicated by a. C represents the complex number set, |a|
denotes the amplitude of the complex scalar a and arg(a) its
phase, and E{·} is the expectation operator. x ∼ CN (a,A)
indicates a complex Gaussian random vector with mean a and
covariance matrix A.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODELS
The considered system model, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
consists of a Base Station (BS) equipped with N antenna
elements wishing to communicate in the downlink direction
with a legitimate Receiver (RX) having M antennas. This
downlink transmission is assumed to be further empowered
by a legitimate RIS with L unit cells, which is placed close to
RX. In the vicinity of the legitimate BS-RX link exists a K-
antenna Eavesdropper (E) with an eavesdropping RIS of Λ unit
elements close to it, that is intended for enabling legitimate in-
formation decoding at E’s side. We assume that the legitimate
RIS is connected to the legitimate node via dedicated hardware
and control signaling for online reconfigurability; the same
holds for E and the eavesdropping RIS. The BS knows about
the existence of E and focuses on securing its confidential
link with RX; however, it is unaware of the presence of the
eavesdropping RIS. It is also assumed that the deployment of
the legitimate RIS is transparent to E.
We assume throughout this paper that perfect channel
information is available at the BS and E sides via pilot-
assisted channel estimation. Specifically, BS possesses the
channels H ∈ CM×N , H1 ∈ CL×N , and H2 ∈ CM×L
referring to the BS-RX, BS to legitimate RIS, and RX to
legitimate RIS links, respectively. It is also assumed that BS
and E cooperate in order to both estimate the BS-E channel
HE ∈ CK×N as follows: BS transmits pilot signals to E that
estimates HE and then feeds this estimation back to BS. This
cooperation may apply to the case where E plays the dual
role of a legitimate receiver and of an eavesdropper. Recall
that BS is unaware of the existence of the eavesdropping RIS,
hence, it has no knowledge on the BS to eavesdropping RIS
channel G1 ∈ CΛ×N and the eavesdropping RIS to E channel
G2 ∈ C
K×Λ. However, the latter two channels are assumed
available at the E side. We also assume that due to obstacles
there are no actual channels between the legitimate RIS and E,
and the eavesdropping RIS and RX. It is noted that channels
where a RIS is involved can be estimated either at the RIS side
with a single active hardware element [16] or via cascaded
channel estimation with pilot reflection patterns at RIS [17].
In the case of an eavesdropping RIS as in [16], the BS pilots
can be available to the RIS side for channel estimation from
E that possesses them.
A. Received Signal Models and Secrecy Rate
To secure the confidentiality of the legitimate link, BS
applies AN [18] that is jointly designed with the BS precoding
vector v ∈ CN×1 and the legitimate RIS reflection (passive
beamforming) vector φ , [ejθ1 ejθ2 · · · ejθL ]T ∈ CL×1,
where θℓ with ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L denotes the phase shifting value
at the ℓ-th RIS unit element. We represent by x ∈ CN×1
the transmitted signal from the BS antenna elements, which
is composed as x , vs + z, where s is the unit-amplitude
complex-valued legitimate information symbol that is assumed
independent from the AN vector zN×1 having the covariance
matrix Z , E{zzH}. The baseband received signal vectors
yRX ∈ C
M×1 and yE ∈ C
K×1 at the RX and E antenna
elements can be mathematically expressed as
yRX = (H+H2ΦH1) (vs+ z) + nRX, (1)
yE = (HE +G2ΨG1) (vs+ z) + nE, (2)
where Φ , diag{φ} ∈ CL×L and Ψ , diag{ψ} ∈ CΛ×Λ
with ψ , [ejξ1 ejξ2 · · · ejξΛ ]T ∈ CΛ×1 being the eavesdrop-
ping RIS reflection vector in which ξk with k = 1, 2, . . . ,Λ
represents the phase shifting value at the k-th RIS unit element.
In the latter two expressions, nRX ∼ CN (0M×1, σ2IM )
and nE ∼ CN (0K×1, σ2IK) stand for the Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) vectors.
By assuming ideal capacity-achieving combining at RX
and that E deploys the combining vector w ∈ CK×1 (to
be explicitly designed later on), the achievable rates at the
legitimate and eavesdropping links are given, respectively, by
RRX , log2
∣∣∣∣IM+H˜vvHH˜H
(
σ2IM+H˜ZH˜
H
)−1∣∣∣∣ , (3)
RE , log2

1 + wHH˜EvvHH˜
H
Ew
wH
(
σ2IK+H˜EZH˜
H
E
)
w

 , (4)
where H˜ , H + H2ΦH1 and H˜E , HE + G2ΨG1. The
secrecy rate is then obtained as Rs , max{RRX −RE, 0}.
Algorithm 1 Eavesdropping Design Solving OPE
1: Input: n = 0, ǫ > 0, H¯E, ZF precoder v, feasiblew
(0)and
ψ(0), and R¯
(0)
E as defined in OPE.
2: for n = 1, 2, . . .
3: Compute H¯E = G2 diag{ψ
(n−1)}G1.
4: Given ψ(n−1), obtainw
(n)
opt = σ
−2umax(H¯Evv
HH¯
H
E ).
5: Using w(n), obtain [ψ
(n)
opt]k = [c]k/|[c]k| ∀k.
6: if R¯
(n)
E − R¯
(n−1)
E < ǫ, break; end if.
7: end for
8: Output: w(n) and ψ(n).
B. Design of the Eavesdropping Parameters w and ψ
We assume that E is unaware of the fact that BS transmits
the AN vector z and jointly designs w and ψ profiting from
the availability of the channelsHE,G1, andG2. To this end, E
considers that BS performs ZF precoding to null HE, as such,
it assumes that its baseband received signal is given by y¯E ,
G2ΨG1vs + nE (and not as in (2) including AN). It then
formulates the following joint design optimization problem:
OPE : max
w,ψ
R¯E , log2
(
1 + σ−2wHH¯Evv
HH¯
H
Ew
)
s.t. wHw = 1, |ψk| = 1 ∀k = 1, 2, . . . ,Λ,
where H¯E , G2ΨG1. This problem focusing on maximizing
E’s achievable rate (in the way E conceives this metric)
is non-convex due to the coupled optimization variables in
R¯E and the unit-modulus constraints. To solve it, we adopt
the following Alternating Optimization (AO) approach: w is
obtained for fixed ψ, and then keeping the derived w fixed,
the new ψ is calculated; this approach is followed till the
convergence ofOPE’s objective. Keepingψ fixed inOPE and
removing the constraint for it, leads to an optimization problem
over w, which is solved as wopt = σ
−2umax(H¯Evv
HH¯
H
E ).
Then, for fixed w, the resulting optimization problem over
ψ can be shown to be solved with [ψopt]k = [c]k/|[c]k|
∀k = 1, 2, . . . ,Λ, where c , diag(G1v)
HGH2 w [19]. The
AO algorithm solving OPE is summarized in Algorithm 1.
III. PROPOSED RIS-EMPOWERED SECRECY DESIGN
According to the considered system model, BS lacks knowl-
edge about the existence of an eavesdropping RIS. Hence, its
believed baseband received signal at E given the availability
of HE at its side is yˆE , HE (vs+ z) + nE, instead of the
actual signal in (2). Using the latter expression and assuming
capacity-achieving combining at E, the BS formulates E’s
achievable rate as the following function of v and Z:
RˆE, log2
∣∣∣∣IK +HEvvHHHE
(
σ2IK +HEZH
H
E
)−1∣∣∣∣ . (5)
In this paper, we consider the following secrecy rate max-
imization problem for the joint design of the legitimate BS
precoding vector v and AN covariance matrix Z, and the
reflection vector φ of the legitimate RIS:
OPL : max
φ,v,Z0
Rˆs , RRX − RˆE
s.t. Tr(vvH) + Tr(Z) ≤ P,
|φℓ| = 1 ∀ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L,
where P denotes the total transmit power budget. The latter
joint design problem is solved via the following AO approach.
1) OPL’s optimization with respect to v: By holding φ
and Z fixed in OPL and applying the Sylvester’s determinant
identity, the following design problem arises:
OPL,v : max
v
1 + vHH˜
H
(
σ2IM + H˜ZH˜
H
)−1
H˜v
1 + vHHHE
(
σ2IK +HEZH
H
E
)−1
HEv
s.t. Tr(vvH) ≤ P − Tr(Z),
which can be shown to be equivalently expressed in the
following unconstrained form:
OP ′L,v : max
v
vHY1v
vHY2v
,
where matrices Y1,Y2 ∈ CN×N are obtained as
Y1 ,
1
P − Tr(Z)
IN+H˜
H
(
σ2IM + H˜ZH˜
H
)−1
H˜, (6)
Y2 ,
1
P − Tr(Z)
IN+H
H
E
(
σ2IK +HEZH
H
E
)−1
HE. (7)
The optimal solution for the generalized Rayleigh quotient in
OP ′L,v is given by
vopt =
√
P − Tr(Z)umax
(
Y−12 Y1
)
. (8)
2) OPL’s optimization with respect to Z: We define Z˜ ∈
CN×N such that Z = Z˜Z˜
H
and consider the following Lemma
resulting from [20] for expressing Rˆs in an equivalent form.
Lemma 1. Suppose that M ∈ CN×N with M  0 is
expressed as M = (ABC− IN ) (ABC− IN )
H +ARAH ,
where A ∈ CN×M , B ∈ CM×N , C ∈ CN×N , and
R ∈ CM×M with R ≻ 0. Let also the scalar function
f(S,A) , log2|S| − Tr(SM) + N with S ∈ C
N×N . The
following maximum values for f(S,A) hold:
log2|M
−1| = max
S≻0
f(S,A), (9)
log2
∣∣IN + (BC)HR−1BC∣∣ = max
S≻0,A
f(S,A), (10)
where (9)’s value is obtained with the solution Sopt =M
−1
.
We first make use of Sylvester’s determinant identity and
Lemma 1 for N = 1 to re-express RRX in OPL’s objective
in the following form:
RRX = max
s¯>0,q
(log2(s¯)− s¯m+ 1) , (11)
where the unknown q ∈ CM×1 denotes RX’s combining
vector and m , E
{
|qHyRX − s|
2
}
represents the symbol’s
Mean Squared Error (MSE), which can be computed as
m = |qHH˜v − 1|2 + qH
(
σ2IM + H˜Z˜Z˜
H
H˜
H
)
q. (12)
In the sequel, we consider the following two formulas:
RˆE,1 = log2
∣∣∣IK + σ−2HEZ˜Z˜HHHE
∣∣∣ , (13)
RˆE,2 = log2
∣∣∣IK + σ−2HE
(
vvH + Z˜Z˜
H
)
HHE
∣∣∣ . (14)
After some straightforward manipulations, RˆE in OPL’s ob-
jective can be re-expressed as RˆE = −RˆE,1 + RˆE,2. Based
on Lemma 1, RˆE,1 and RˆE,2 can be re-written as
RˆE,1 = max
S1≻0,A
(log2|S1| − Tr (S1M) +N) , (15)
−RˆE,2 = max
S2≻0
(
log2|S2| − Tr
(
S2
(
IK + σ
−2HE
×(vvH + Z˜Z˜
H
)HHE
))
+K
)
,
(16)
where M= (AHHEZ˜ − IN )(A
HHEZ˜ − IN )H + σ2A
HA,
S1 ∈ C
N×N and S2 ∈ C
K×K . By using (11), (15), and (16),
the desired optimization with respect to Z˜ and the introduced
auxiliary variables is expressed as follows:
OPL,X : max
X
R¯s , RRX + RˆE,1 − RˆE,2
s.t. Tr(Z˜Z˜
H
) ≤ P − Tr(vvH),
where set X , {Z˜,q,A, s¯ > 0,S1 ≻ 0,S2 ≻ 0}. It can be
shown that OPL,X is not jointly convex, but it is convex with
respect to the block of variables {q,A}, {s¯,S1,S2}, and Z˜.
We next solve this problem with an AO-based approach.
Optimizing OPL,X with respect to {q,A}: For fixed
{s¯,S1,S2}, A, and Z˜, the following problem is deduced
OPL,q : max
q
=
(
qHH˜vvHH˜
H
q− qHH˜v − vHH˜
H
q
+ qHH˜Z˜Z˜
H
H˜
H
q+ σ2qHq
)
,
which is solved by equating to zero its first-order partial
derivative with respect to q∗, yielding
qopt =
(
σ2IM + H˜vv
HH˜
H
+ H˜Z˜Z˜
H
H˜
H
)−1
H˜v. (17)
Following a similar procedure for the optimization with respect
to A’s, results in the following optimal solution:
Aopt =
(
σ2IK +HEZ˜Z˜
H
HHE
)−1
HEZ˜. (18)
Optimizing OPL,X with respect to {s¯,S1,S2}: By substi-
tuting (17) into (12), the MSE for s at RX is given by
m = 1−vHH˜
H
(
σ2IM+H˜
(
vvH+Z˜Z˜
H
)
H˜
H
)−1
H˜v, (19)
which, after applying the matrix inversion lemma, it yields
s¯opt = 1+σ
−2vHH˜
H
(
IM + σ
−2H˜Z˜Z˜
H
H˜
H
)−1
H˜v. (20)
In a similar manner, we set S1 = M
−1 in (15). Then by
substituting Aopt given in (18), we have that:
S1,opt = IN + σ
−2Z˜
H
HHEHEZ˜. (21)
The optimum S2 is obtained in an analogous way as
S2,opt =
(
IK + σ
−2
(
HE
(
vvH + Z˜Z˜
H
)
HHE
))−1
. (22)
Optimizing OPL,X with respect to Z˜: The objective of this
problem can be re-expressed as the following function of Z˜:
R¯s =− Tr
(
HHEAS1A
HHEZ˜Z˜
H
)
− s¯Tr
(
H˜
H
qqHH˜Z˜Z˜
H
)
+Tr
(
HHEAS1Z˜
H
)
+Tr
(
S1A
HHEZ˜
)
− σ2Tr
(
HHE S2HEZ˜Z˜
H
)
,
(23)
which leads to the following maximization problem:
OPL,Z˜ : max
Z˜
R¯s s.t. Tr(Z˜Z˜
H
) ≤ P − Tr(vvH).
The Lagrangian function for the latter problem is derived as
L(Z˜, λ) = R¯s(Z˜)−λ
(
Tr
(
Z˜Z˜
H
)
− P +Tr
(
vvH
))
, (24)
with λ ≥ 0 being the Lagrange multiplier. By setting to zero
its first-order derivative with respect to Z˜
∗
results in
Z˜opt = (λIN +D)
−1
HHEAS1, (25)
where D , s¯H˜
H
qqHH˜ +HHEAS1A
HHE + σ
2HHE S2HE.
To finally guarantee convergence of OPL,Z˜’s solution to
a KarushKuhnTucker point and satisfy the complementary
slackness condition, we solve the following dual problem:
OP ′
L,Z˜
: min
λ≥0
(
max
Z˜
L(Z˜, λ)
)
, (26)
where the inner problem is solved by (25). The outer problem
can be efficiently solved via the bisection method.
3) OPL’s optimization with respect to φ: The optimization
variable φ in OPL appears only in the legitimate rate RRX.
By omitting the logarithm from theRRX expression, we define
the following function of φ:
CRX , v
H (H+H2ΦH1)
H
P (H+H2ΦH1)v, (27)
where P ,
(
σ2IM + (H+H2ΦH1)Z(H+H2ΦH1)
H
)−1
.
Then, by applying basic algebraic manipulations, the OPL
with respect to φ becomes equivalent to
OPL,φ : max
φ
C′RX, s.t. |φℓ| = 1 ∀ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L,
where the objective C′RX is defined as
C′RX =Tr(Hvv
HHHP) + Tr(H1vv
HHHPH2Φ)
+ Tr(HvvHHH1 Φ
HHH2 P)
+ Tr(H2ΦH1vv
HHH1 Φ
HHH2 P).
(28)
The OPL,φ is non-convex with unit-modulus constraints,
which we solve via a Projected Gradient Ascent (PGA)
Algorithm 2 Proposed Secrecy Design Solving OPL
1: Input: n = 0, ǫ, µ > 0, H˜, HE, feasible v
(0), Z(0), φ(0)
and Rˆ
(0)
s as defined in OPL.
2: for n = 1, 2, . . .
3: Update v(n) according to (8).
4: Given v(n), compute q, A, s¯, S1, and S2 using (17),
(18), (20), (21), and (22), respectively.
5: Solve OP ′
L,Z˜
in (26) and set Z(n) = Z˜
(n)
(Z˜
(n)
)H .
6: Solve OPL,φ using the PGA algorithm to obtain φ
(n).
7: if Rˆ
(n)
s − Rˆ
(n−1)
s < ǫ, break; end if.
8: end for
9: Output: v(n), Z(n), and φ
(n)
.
algorithm similar to [21]. To this end, we first compute the
gradient vector ∀ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L as ∇φℓC
′
RX =
∑4
j=1[Fj ]ℓ,ℓ
with
F1 , −H
H
2 PHvv
HHHPH¯Φ, (29)
F2 , −H
H
2 PH2ΦH1vv
HHHPH¯Φ, (30)
F3 ,H
H
2 PHvv
HHH1
−HH2 PHvv
HHH1 Φ
HHH2 PH¯Φ,
(31)
F4 ,H
H
2 PH2ΦH1vv
HHH1
−HH2 PH2ΦH1vv
HHH1 Φ
HHH2 PH¯Φ,
(32)
where H¯Φ , HZH
H
1 +H2ΦH1ZH
H
1 . For the latter deriva-
tions, we have used the rule ∂(M−1) = −M−1 (∂M)M−1.
It is noted that each Fj corresponds to (28)’s j-th summand.
Then, φ is computed via the following iterative procedure: by
using a random feasible initialization φ(1), the φ(i+1) at the
(i+1)-th iteration of the PGA algorithm is obtained from the
φ(i) of the i-th iteration as
φ˜
(i+1)
= φ(i) + µ∇φℓC
′
RX, (33)
φ(i+1) = exp
(
j arg
(
φ˜
(i+1)
))
, (34)
where µ > 0 denotes the algorithmic step size.
All previously presented algorithmic steps solving OPL for
the proposed RIS-empowered joint secrecy design of φ, v, and
Z are summarized in Algorithm 2.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we investigate the secrecy rate performance
of the proposed PLS scheme over frequency flat Rayleigh
fading channels with zero mean and unit variance, and for
distance-dependent pathloss with exponent equal to 2 for all
involved links. We have particularly evaluated the achiev-
able rates of the legitimate and eavesdropping links using
expressions (3) for RRX and (4) for RE, respectively, and
Rs providing the achievable secrecy rate. In the results that
follow, we have considered that E adopts the proposed RIS-
empowered design presented in Section II-B including receive
combining. For the legitimate system, we have used the pro-
posed PLS scheme in Section III encompassing BS precoding,
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Fig. 2. Achievable rates in bps/Hz at the legitimate RX and the eavesdropper
E versus the transmit SNR in dB for different values N for the legitimate BS
antennas and different numbers Λ for the unit elements at the eavesdropping
RIS. The legitimate system does not possess a RIS trying to safeguard
confidential communication with only BS precoding and AN.
AN, and legitimate RIS passive beamforming, as well as a
special version of it for the case where a legitimate RIS is not
available. For this special version, we have solved a similar
problem to OPL via Lemma 1 and AO, by removing the
links involving the legitimate RIS and the optimization over
its relevant variable φ. In our simulations, the BS was located
in the origin of the xy plane, whereas RX and E lied on a
circle of radius 10m in the angles 45o and 85o, respectively,
from BS. The first unit element of the eavesdropping RIS was
placed in the middle of the line connecting RX and E, and the
other elements expand along the positive directions of the x
and y axes. In a similar manner, the legitimate RIS is placed
in the same circle as RX and E in the angle 20o from BS.
In addition, we have used the following parameter setting:
N = {8, 32}, M = K = 4, L = 50, σ2 = 1, and 1000
independent Monte Carlo realizations.
We commence in Fig. 2 with the achievable rate perfor-
mance in bps/Hz for the legitimate and eavesdropping links
as functions of the BS transmit SNR, defined as P/σ2. For
these results, we have considered that the legitimate system
does not include a RIS, and targets at securing confidential
transmissions with only BS precoding and AN. It can be seen
from both subfigures that the rates increase with increasing
SNR for both the legitimate and eavesdropping links. In the
left subfigure for N = 8 BS antennas, it is depicted that RX’s
rate is larger than E’s rate for Λ = 20, however, when the
larger simulated values for Λ are considered, E’s rate is similar
or larger than that of RX. This reveals that, with the proposed
schemes for RX and E, the secrecy rate equals to 0 for cases
of existence of an eavesdropping RIS with Λ > 60 unit
elements. For such cases, BS precoding and AN are incapable
of safeguarding the legitimate link. In the right subfigure of
Fig. 2, we have set the BS antennas as N = 32. Interestingly,
the increase in N results in improvement of both the legitimate
and the eavesdropping rates, implying that the eavesdropping
RIS can even in this case enable information stealth. This is
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Fig. 3. Achievable secrecy rates in bps/Hz versus the transmit SNR in dB
for N = 8 antenna elements at the legitimate BS, L = 50 unit elements
at the legitimate RIS, and different numbers Λ for the unit elements of the
eavesdropping RIS. In contrast to Fig.2, the legitimate system safeguards
communication with BS precoding, AN, and RIS passive beamforming.
particularly true for Λ = 100 resulting in secrecy rate equal
to 0. The latter behavior happens due to the fact that BS is
unaware of the eavesdropping RIS’s presence possessing only
HE for its joint design. Increasing N can improve the secrecy
rate, but only for eavesdropping RISs with small number of
elements. Note that Λ can be much higher than N [6].
In Fig. 3, we consider that the legitimate system deploys a
RIS with L = 50 unit elements and applies the joint design
of Section III. We have plotted the achievable secrecy rates in
bps/Hz versus the transmit SNR in dB for the case where the
BS antennas are set to N = 8, and for different numbers Λ
for the unit elements of the eavesdropping RIS. It is obvious
that for all considered Λ values, the resulting secrecy rates
are positive implying the feasibility of secure communication.
Clearly, the closer to the value L = 50 the value of Λ is, the
larger is the secrecy rate, which for all cases increases with
increasing transmit SNR. This reveals that the adoption of even
a small-sized legitimate RIS provides security guarantees over
RIS-empowered eavesdropping systems. As an example from
Fig. 3, a legitimate RIS with L = 50 yields positive secrecy
rates even when Λ = 180, i.e., for an eavesdropping RIS with
3× more unit elements.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied RIS-empowered PLS systems,
where RISs are deployed from both the legitimate and the
eavesdropping subsystems. We focused on the case where the
RISs are placed close to the receivers and their existence is
unknown to the competing system. A joint design of legitimate
precoding, AN, and legitimate RIS passive beamforming was
presented that was shown to be capable of safeguardingMIMO
communication over RIS-empowered eavesdropping systems.
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